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1. Introduction 
This paper is an empirical investigation of how long institutions hold equities. Many theories and 
empirical studies in the finance literature are related to institutional holding periods, though none to our 
knowledge directly address the question of how institutions choose how long to hold a trade. Corporate 
finance studies routinely use the percentage of common stock held by institutions as a proxy for the 
sophistication of the investors holding the security, typically finding that companies held by “long term” 
institutions are better priced. Empirical studies find that stocks held by institutions are better governed 
(Chung and Zhang, 2011; Ferreira and Matos, 2008), more efficiently priced (Boehmer and Kelley, 
2009), and have lower agency costs (Wang and Nanda, 2011) than stocks held by retail investors. In 
contrast, the literature on delegated portfolio management offers substantial evidence that institutions do 
not make decisions based on information or portfolio optimization. Mutual funds appear to select stocks 
based on familiarity (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker, 2012), sell stocks based 
on the disposition effect (Frazzini, 2005), engage in transactions solely for the purpose of presenting a 
more favorable list of stocks (“window dressing”) (Sias and Starks, 1997), and earn risk-adjusted returns 
lower than simple passive strategies (Fama and French, 2010).1 For pension funds, the available evidence 
paints a similar picture (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991). Yet there has been little 
examination of the actual trading patterns of institutions as a window into whether their behavior 
indicates that they are informed optimizers.  
 This is the first study to examine a wide range of holding periods of institutional investors, from 
intraday trades to those held for many years. We believe that our analysis of institutional trade holding 
periods (durations) can inform the disparate views of institutions and may help to resolve some of the 
controversy over whether they behave as rational optimizers or exhibit agency problems and behavioral 
                                                            
1 A recent exception to the generally negative assessment of fund managers is provided by Berk and van Binsbergen (2012), 
who find evidence that mutual fund manager skill exists and is persistent. 
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biases.2 If institutional trading is largely determined by portfolio managers acting as rational optimizers, 
we expect to see more short-duration trades when market volatility is higher, fund flow volatility is 
higher, and trading costs are lower. Furthermore, we expect informed traders to choose the holding period 
that maximizes the advantage of their information. If institutional trading is also affected by agency 
problems and behavioral biases, we expect to see the disposition effect leading to higher realized returns 
in short-duration trades relative to longer-duration trades, or, alternatively, overconfidence and/or the 
desire to demonstrate activity leading to short-duration trades with low returns.3  
Using a proprietary database of the daily U.S. equity transactions of over 4000 institutional 
money managers and pension funds, we match stock purchases and sales within each fund to identify the 
holding periods and returns of over 120 million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009. For our trade 
duration analysis we focus on the subset of funds present in the database for at least five years: 1186 
funds responsible for over 105 million round-trip trades, with a total volume of over 292 billion shares. 
We find a surprising incidence of short-duration trades: Over 96% of the institutional funds execute 
round-trip trades lasting less than one month, and in aggregate over 7% of the volume occurs in trades 
that are held for less than one month (23% occurs in trades that are held for less than three months). The 
prevalence of short-duration trades appears surprising in light of the typically low annual turnover rates 
for mutual funds and pension funds.  
Our empirical results provide limited support for the idea that institutions make trading decisions 
based on portfolio optimization. For example, we find some evidence of shorter holding periods during 
times of higher market volatility, when the cost of being at a suboptimal portfolio allocation may be 
greater. But institutions appear to hold their trades longer when fund flow volatility is higher and hold 
illiquid stocks for shorter periods, all else equal, contrary to the rational optimizer predictions. We find 
little support for the disposition effect as a driver of short-duration trades. While some short-duration 
                                                            
2 Throughout this paper we use the terms “trade holding period” and “trade duration” interchangeably to describe the amount of 
time from entry to exit in a round-trip trade. See Section 3.1 for a description of the identification of round-trip trades. 
3 We develop these predictions in Section 2. 
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trades have high returns, short-duration trades have negative returns on average and many funds engage in 
unprofitable short-duration trades that do not appear consistent with simply “cutting one’s losses.” Short-
duration trades are not more common following higher returns, suggesting that short-duration trading is 
not driven by attribution-based overconfidence, although it may be due to overconfidence more generally 
or managers’ desire to show they are active. We find evidence of persistent skill and/or information in 
funds’ short-duration trade returns; we also find that some funds are persistently unskilled and/or 
uninformed. The picture that emerges suggests that the narrative of institutions as informed, sophisticated 
portfolio optimizers is at best a limited description.  
While this is the first paper to provide a detailed study of institutional trade holding periods per 
se, prior papers provide interesting and important results that relate to this work. Puckett and Yan (2011) 
examine the intra-quarter trading skill of institutional traders to explain the difference between reported 
fund returns and the returns on portfolios that invest in a fund’s quarterly-disclosed holdings (the “return 
gap”). Our study is distinct from Puckett and Yan’s in that we consider the holding periods of all round-
trip trades, rather than focusing on the intra-quarter transactions that are relevant to the return gap (a 
combination of intra-quarter round-trip trades and longer-term trades marked to market at the end of the 
quarter). Our findings provide a different perspective on trading skill, showing that although fund 
managers may demonstrate positive trading skill between quarterly reporting dates (Puckett and Yan, 
2011), their short-term trades are not generally profitable when considered more broadly. In contrast to 
the daily trading data used in this paper and in Puckett and Yan (2011), Cremers and Pareek (2010) and 
Cremers, Pareek, and Sautner (2012) use quarterly changes in reported holdings to categorize institutions 
as short-term versus long-term investors, finding that the presence of short-term investors is associated 
with temporary price distortions and return anomalies. They interpret this as evidence that short-term 
investors are affected by behavioral biases, consistent with our finding that institutional investors’ short-
term trades appear to be driven by behavioral biases or agency problems. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we first build a simple model of 
institutional trading that forms the basis for our hypotheses and then consider deviations from the rational 
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optimizing framework. Section 3 describes our data and sample and details our methodology for 
identifying round-trip trades. Section 4 presents our tests of the informed optimizer hypotheses, and 
Section 5 extends our analysis into holding period returns to explore the behavioral rent-seeker 
hypotheses. Section 6 discusses robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. Two appendices detail the 
matching of Ancerno transaction data to CRSP and the implementation of double-clustered standard 
errors used throughout the paper.  
2. Why do institutions trade? 
 To frame our analysis of institutional trade holding periods, it is useful to begin with a more 
fundamental question: Why do institutions trade? In the following subsection, we build a model of 
institutional trading that relates a fund manager’s costs and benefits of trading to the holding period of the 
fund’s trades. We then consider several additional factors that influence trade duration and outline 
testable hypotheses.  
2.1. A baseline model 
 Trading is commonly thought of as related to information, investor flows, transaction costs, and 
optimization. To study the interplay between optimization and transaction costs, we model as a baseline 
an institution with no informational advantages and no inflows, outflows, agency problems, or behavioral 
biases. We assume the institution exists because it provides efficient portfolios at a lower transaction cost 
than that available to the clients who give it money. It is clear that the means, variances, and covariances 
defining the efficient set will change over time and that the portfolio manager must periodically change 
the weights to keep the portfolio efficient, but how often will the portfolio manager rebalance? Shortening 
the time interval between portfolio revisions reduces the chance of a suboptimal portfolio allocation but 
also increases the cost of trading. If the moments of the distribution are known with perfect certainty then 
the revision time is simply whenever the cost of inefficiency is greater than the transaction cost of 
revision. But since these moments must be estimated and are best known only ex-post, the revision time is 
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random. If trade durations are random variables, can we still describe our stylized institution as 
optimizing trade holding periods by minimizing costs?  
The answer is yes, if we are willing to further assume that the institution is long-lived and costs 
are stationary. To see this, denote the time between the (i-1)st and the ith revision as Xi. Let F(x) = Pr(Xi≤ 
x) and assume that the random revision times X1,X2,… are independent and identically distributed. This 
assumption of a stationary distribution of revision times clearly will not be the case in practice, but this 
baseline assumption lets us focus on revisions as a function of a random transaction cost and the random 
cost of suboptimality.  
 The Xi generate a renewal process that is defined by counting the number of revisions in a 
specified time period. The total time for n revisions is the sum Sn = X1+···+Xn. Associated with the sum is 
a counting process that simply counts the number of revisions between two points in time. Let N(t) equal 
the number of revisions between time 0 and time t, where N(0) = 0. The revisions will generate a cost, Yi, 
composed of both a suboptimality cost and a transaction cost of re-aligning the weights. Ex-ante, the Yi 
are random for the same reason that Xi are random: means, variances, and covariances are known only 
with historical data. The pairs (Xi, Yi) are random variables, and we will assume that each series is i.i.d. 
The portfolio manager’s problem of choosing the optimal number of revisions over a horizon (0, τ] is one 
of minimizing costs. Since there are N(τ) revisions, he wishes to minimize the expected costs of N(τ) 
revisions, or: 
ܣሺτሻ ൌ Eሺ෍ ௜ܻ	ሻ
ேሺதሻ
௜ୀଵ
 
A standard result for the function A(τ) (see Karlin and Taylor, 1998, p. 432) is: 
limத→ஶ ஺ሺதሻத ൌ 	
ாሺ௒భሻ
ாሺ௑భሻ                             (1) 
For large τ, the long-run cumulative cost per unit of time is approximately the expected cost of the first 
revision divided by the time to the first revision.  
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 Putting more structure on the numerator of Eq. (1) gives a clearer picture of the determinants of 
trade holding periods in the baseline case. Suppose that the transaction cost is a constant, c1, and the cost 
of suboptimality, c2, is a function of time, c2 = c2 (T), where the decreased return and/or increased risk 
from not revising the portfolio grows over time, or ܿଶᇱ ሺܶሻ ൒ 0. Intuitively the percentage of time that the 
portfolio is suboptimal is the probability that Xi is less than or equal to T, or F(T), while the fraction of 
time that the portfolio will not be suboptimal is 1-F(T). We can write: 
																																				ܻ݅ ൌ 	 ൜ܿ1ݓ݅ݐ݄	݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	1 െ ܨሺܶሻܿ2	ݓ݅ݐ݄	݌ݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	ܨሺܶሻ   
That is, if the portfolio becomes suboptimal before the portfolio manager trades, the cost is c2, otherwise 
the cost is c1 from trading. Therefore, E(Y1) = c1[1-F(T)] + c2F(T) and the expected long-run cost per unit 
of time using Eq. (1) is 
ܮሺܶሻ ൌ ௖భሾଵି୊ሺ୘ሻሿା	௖మ୊ሺ୘ሻாሺ௑భሻ ൌ ܮଵሺܶሻ ൅ ܮଶሺܶሻ,        (2) 
where L1(T) = c1[1-F(T)]/E(X1) and L2(T) = c2F(T)/ E(X1). Since c2 and F(T) are monotonically 
increasing in T and 0≤F(T) ≤ 1, we have that ܮଵᇱ ሺܶሻ ൑ 0 and ܮଶᇱ ሺܶሻ ൒ 0. Noting that L1(0) = c1 and L2(0) 
= 0, we can illustrate the portfolio manager’s problem graphically as follows: 
 
 
 
L1+L2=C
L2
L1
C*
T*
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The cost minimization yields an optimal trading time, T*, which is a function of the transaction 
cost and the cost of suboptimality. A lower transaction cost would shift L1 downward and shorten the 
optimal trading time. Faster changes in the efficient set would increase the cost of suboptimality, shifting 
L2 upward and shortening the optimal trading time.4 The baseline institution will therefore have a shorter 
trade holding period in markets with lower transaction costs and more estimation risk, which is clearly a 
function of the volatility of means, variances, and covariances.5    
2.2. Information, investor flows, agency problems, and behavioral biases 
In practice, trade durations (represented in the baseline model by the random revision times 
X1,X2,...) are likely not independent and identically distributed. The time interval between revisions may 
be a function of information advantages, flows into and out of the portfolio, agency problems, and 
behavioral biases. Below we highlight how each of these factors may affect institutional trade duration.  
Institutions with information advantages will trade when the expected profit is greater than the 
cost of trading. Whether institutions actually have information advantages was first examined by Jensen 
(1968), who argued there is little evidence that the mutual fund industry produces significant risk-adjusted 
returns. Recent evidence has sharpened the debate. Using bootstrap methods, Kosowski, Timmerman, 
Wermers, and White (2006) conclude that there is statistically significant evidence of information 
advantages for some mutual funds, while Fama and French (2010) conclude the opposite. For managers 
of funds with institutional clients such as pension funds, Busse, Goyal, and Wahal (2010) conclude that 
there is only weak evidence of informational advantages. At a minimum, it appears that information 
advantages are rare enough that they are unlikely to explain the majority of trades.  
                                                            
4 Conversations with practitioners confirm that the baseline model developed here captures the intuition underlying the trading 
decisions of purely quantitative funds, which constantly weigh the trade-off between rebalancing needs and transaction costs, 
albeit with transaction costs modeled in a more sophisticated way.  
5 It is also plausible that the estimation risk of an efficient portfolio increases with the risk of the efficient portfolio. If 
transaction costs do not increase with the risk of the portfolio, then the optimal trade holding period will fall as the risk of the 
efficient portfolio increases and the return increases. 
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Investor flows into and out of the portfolio are a second potential reason for trading (e.g., Coval 
and Stafford, 2007). An optimizing fund will quickly respond to investor flows since increasing cash 
obtained from inflows or holding cash for outflows increases the suboptimality cost for the fund.6  
Agency problems constitute a third reason for institutional trading. For both mutual fund 
managers and managers of funds with institutional clients, such as pension funds, lack of transparency 
and the nature of the industry create a fertile environment for agency problems, initially identified by 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). Fund managers may engage in window dressing, removing 
poor performers from a portfolio and/or purchasing stocks that have done well recently to present a more 
favorable impression of the fund’s holdings. This tendency is particularly pronounced at the end of an 
evaluation period, such as the end of the calendar year, and has received considerable attention in the 
literature (e.g., Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge, 2010; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and 
Vishny, 1991; and Sias and Starks, 1997). Agency problems may also lead fund managers to trade merely 
to show that they are doing something. Dow and Gorton (1997) predict that when clients cannot 
distinguish between when a portfolio manager is “actively doing nothing” (not trading because he finds 
no profitable trading opportunities) versus “simply doing nothing” (not trading due to laziness or 
shirking), managers trade even though they have no reason to prefer one asset over another. A manager 
engaging in window dressing strategies or trading to appear active to impress current or prospective 
investors is likely to make trading decisions without reference to the efficiency of the portfolio. In short, 
the trading has nothing to do with costs or optimization.  
Finally, a recent literature has developed to investigate whether people trade because of 
behavioral biases. One such documented bias that has direct implications for trade duration is the 
“disposition effect,” which is the tendency of investors to ride losses and realize gains, based on prospect 
                                                            
6 The reasons for fund inflows and outflows are themselves a widely studied topic in the finance literature. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) are the first to identify the “flow performance” relation for mutual fund investors, finding that investors respond far 
more to top performance than to poor performance, while studies examining retail investor flows find that mutual fund 
redemptions are idiosyncratic and based upon investors’ liquidity needs (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Shive and Yun 
(2013) show that patient traders can profit from flow-induced trades of mutual funds. Spiegel and Zhang (2013) provide an 
overview of the evidence and estimation issues involved in funds’ flow-performance relation. 
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theory and mental accounting. The disposition effect was initially documented as a behavioral bias of 
individuals (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), but Frazzini (2005) finds evidence that mutual fund managers 
are subject to the disposition effect in his study of post-earnings announcement drift. Overconfidence, the 
tendency of investors to trade frequently but unprofitably, has been documented among individual 
investors (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Odean, 1999), but not among institutional portfolio managers to 
our knowledge.7 Overconfidence suggests that short-duration trades should have low returns, while the 
disposition effect suggests they should have high returns. Other studies find mutual fund managers 
exhibiting a range of behavioral biases. Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) document managers’ 
preference to invest proportionately more in the stock of companies whose headquarters are located near 
the mutual fund. Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012) find that stocks of firms located in the state where a 
portfolio manager grew up are disproportionately represented in the manager’s portfolio. Bailey, Kumar, 
and Ng (2011) show that behavioral biases of investors spill over into their choice of mutual fund 
investments, which in turn could affect the holdings of these funds. Choi and Sias (2009) find that 
institutional investors show strong evidence of herding behavior, following each other into and out of the 
same industries. With the exception of the disposition effect and overconfidence, these behavioral biases 
do not lead to specific predictions about the length of trade holding period of funds, but they generally 
suggest that trading strategies are chosen for reasons other than those captured in our baseline model of 
the rational optimizer.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
 Informed optimizer. If institutional investors make trading decisions based on rational portfolio 
optimization, we expect to find evidence that trading horizons are related to market volatility, transaction 
costs, fund flows, and information. We refer to this description as the “informed optimizer” hypothesis.  
                                                            
7 In a recent study of Swedish mutual fund managers, Bodnaruk and Simonov (2012) find that managers exhibit a negative 
disposition effect (selling losers and holding onto winners) in their personal portfolios, but they do not examine trades in the 
mutual funds. Although not directly related to fund management, Graham & Harvey (2003) find that chief financial officers, a 
group that should be more sophisticated, exhibit overconfidence. 
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The baseline model suggests that when transaction costs are lower or volatility is higher, 
institutions should trade more frequently. This has several implications for the frequency of trades of 
different holding periods. Institutions should choose longer holding periods for stocks with higher 
transactions costs.8 Times of higher market volatility should lead to an increase in short-duration trades, 
as the cost of having a sub-optimal portfolio allocation is greater when volatility is higher. Furthermore, 
optimizing institutions should quickly respond to investor flows because holding cash positions for 
outflows or enlarging cash positions for inflows reduces portfolio efficiency. Thus higher volatility in 
mutual fund flows should result in more short-duration trading.  
The baseline model predicts that there should be no relation between returns and trading horizon, 
because all optimizers choose efficient portfolios and optimize trade holding periods based on costs. 
Extending the rational optimizer intuition to the case where institutions have information, fund managers 
should choose the holding period that maximizes the advantage of their information. Since some 
information is likely to be short-lived and other information is likely to be long-lived, institutions 
optimizing based on their informational advantages should not in aggregate lead to systematic patterns of 
returns across different holding periods unless it is the case that the majority of information has a 
particular lifespan.  
Behavioral rent-seeker. The competing description of institutional investors is that they do not 
make decisions based on informed optimization but rather allow agency problems and behavioral factors 
to drive their portfolio choices. We refer to this description as the “behavioral rent-seeker” hypothesis.  
If managers engage in trades that are not optimal, they will increase transaction costs and reduce 
the efficiency of the portfolio. This implies that trades related to behavioral, rent-seeking strategies will 
have low returns and managers will not be responsive to fund flows, because the efficiency of the 
portfolio is not as important as other factors. If we assume that the reference point is the price at which a 
trade is initiated, the disposition effect implies that shorter duration trades should have higher returns and 
                                                            
8 Goncalves-Pinto (2009) derives a similar prediction in a model of delegated portfolio management with fund-flow-to-
performance, finding that a liquidity-constrained money manager engages in more active trading in more liquid assets.  
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longer duration trades should have lower returns, as portfolio managers sell winners and hold on to losers. 
Overconfidence implies that short-duration trades should have lower returns, as overconfident investors 
have a propensity to trade frequently but unsuccessfully. Trading simply to show that a portfolio manager 
is active should also lead to more short-duration trades with low returns, as they are undertaken for 
reasons other than maximizing returns. Window dressing could lead to low returns on either long- or 
short-duration trades, as window dressing has no direct implications for how long trades are held.   
3. Data, Methodology, and Sample 
We obtain institutional trading data from Ancerno Ltd., a widely recognized consulting firm that 
monitors trade execution costs for institutional clients. In order to provide execution cost analysis, 
Ancerno collects detailed transaction information for all equity transactions executed by each client. 
Ancerno’s clients include pension funds (such as CALPERS, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the 
YMCA retirement fund) and money managers (such as Massachusetts Financial Services, Putnam 
Investments, Lazard Asset Management, and Fidelity).9 We also collect stock data and mutual fund 
turnover statistics from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), pension fund turnover 
statistics from Mobius Group, and mutual fund flow data from the Lipper U.S. Funds Flow database, 
provided by Thomson Reuters.  
3.1. Identifying Round-Trip Trades 
To identify round-trip trades and their holding periods, we match buy and sell transactions for the 
same stock within the same fund. In this section we describe the two methods by which we match buy 
and sell transactions: first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out (LIFO). There is no clear consensus on 
which method should be used to match buy and sell transactions into round-trip trades. On one hand, a 
consultant to institutional fund managers told us that “the clock starts when you enter the trade,” implying 
                                                            
9 Previous academic studies that use Ancerno data include Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2012), Goldstein, Irvine, 
Kandel, and Wiener (2009), and Puckett and Yan (2011). Puckett and Yan (2011) estimate that Ancerno clients represent 
approximately 10% of all institutional trading volume.  
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the FIFO approach may be more appropriate. On the other hand, LIFO may more accurately capture the 
change in opinion or information that causes a manager to switch from buying to selling or vice versa. In 
most of our analyses, the FIFO and LIFO trade matching methodologies yield identical inference, so we 
present only results based on the FIFO methodology; where the results differ materially we present and 
discuss both.  
From the Ancerno database, we obtain the following information for each transaction: the ticker 
symbol of the security (symbol), the transaction date (tradedate),10 the identifier for the institution 
(clientcode), such as Fidelity or Putnam, the identifier for the fund within an institution (clientmgrcode), 
such as Fidelity Magellan or Fidelity Equity Income fund, the transaction direction (side, which is 1 for 
buy and -1 for sell transactions), volume of shares transacted (volume), and transaction price (price).11 All 
clientcodes and clientmgrcodes are expressed as numbers, so although we can identify all the transactions 
executed by the same institution or the same fund, we cannot determine the identity of the institution or 
fund. For each symbol-clientcode-clientmgrcode combination, we use data from January 1997 to 
December 2009 to identify round-trip trades. A round-trip trade for a stock is defined as a purchase and a 
sale of the same number of shares in the same fund (identified by clientcode-clientmgrcode).  
To identify the FIFO-based (LIFO-based) round-trip trades, we assemble the transaction 
information for each symbol-clientcode-clientmgrcode combination chronologically into a queue, and 
when a transaction in the opposite direction enters the queue, we match it with the earliest (most recent) 
existing transaction in the queue. The number of trading days between the buy transaction and the sell 
transaction is the holding period of the round-trip trade, and the number of shares bought and sold (which 
are equal under the definition of a round-trip trade) is the round-trip trade quantity. Below we provide 
examples of our FIFO and LIFO trade matching procedures. 
                                                            
10 Because the intraday timestamps in Ancerno are incomplete (e.g., Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman, 2013), we 
identify intraday trades only as round-trip trades in which both the buy and sell transactions occur within the same day; we 
cannot determine precisely for how many hours or minutes they are held.  
11 Ancerno variable names may change over time, so these variable names (which were in effect when we obtained the data in 
2010) may be different in subsequent downloads from Ancerno.  
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Exhibit A shows that clientmgrcode (fund) 131 of clientcode (institution) 515 made ten purchases 
(and no sales) of the stock Amgen Inc. (symbol = AMGN) over the period March 19, 1998 through 
December 16, 1998, at prices ranging from a low of $56.56 to a high of $86.22. Then on March 25, 1999, 
this fund made two sales of AMGN, one at $75.27 for 500 shares and the other at $75.14 for 2400 shares.  
Exhibit A: Buy and sell transactions 
Symbol  | tradedate  | clientcode | clientmgrcode| side | volume | price  
--------+------------+------------+--------------+------+--------+------- 
 AMGN   | 1998-03-19 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 800    | 60.96 
 AMGN   | 1998-04-07 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 700    | 57.62 
 AMGN   | 1998-04-17 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 700    | 57.11 
 AMGN   | 1998-04-22 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 700    | 57.63 
 AMGN   | 1998-04-27 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 700    | 56.56 
 AMGN   | 1998-05-04 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 700    | 58.33 
 AMGN   | 1998-05-11 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 600    | 59.47 
 AMGN   | 1998-12-15 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 400    | 81.72 
 AMGN   | 1998-12-15 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 600    | 82.90 
 AMGN   | 1998-12-16 | 515        | 131         | 1    | 800    | 86.22 
 AMGN   | 1999-03-25 | 515        | 131         | -1   | 500    | 75.27 
 AMGN   | 1999-03-25 | 515        | 131         | -1   | 2400   | 75.14 
 
Exhibit B presents the round-trip trades arising from the buy and sell transactions in Exhibit A 
using FIFO matching. From March 19 through December 16, 1998, all the buy transactions enter our 
transaction queue. Since there are no sell transactions for this symbol-clientcode-clientmgrcode 
combination in 1998, there are no round-trip trades in 1998. We match the first sell transaction for 500 
shares on March 25, 1999 (tradedate) to the first buy transaction in our queue, which occurred on March 
19, 1998 (matchtradedate), to generate the first round-trip trade of 500 shares. The holding period 
(rtdays) for this round-trip trade is 257 trading days, the buy price (bp) is $60.96, and the sell price (sp) is 
$75.27. The next sale of 2400 shares is matched to the 300 shares left over from the trade on March 19, 
1998, and three transactions of 700 shares each, on April 7, April 17, and April 22, 1998. There are 3,800 
shares left in the queue, ready to be matched against incoming sell transactions.  
Exhibit B: FIFO-matched round-trip trades  
 Symbol  | client_mgr | tradedate  | matchtradedate | volume | rtdays |  bp   |  sp    
--------+------------+------------+----------------+--------+--------+-------+------ 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-03-19     | 500    | 257    | 60.96 | 75.27 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-03-19     | 300    | 257    | 60.96 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-04-07     | 700    | 244    | 57.62 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-04-17     | 700    | 237    | 57.11 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-04-22     | 700    | 234    | 57.63 | 75.14 
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Exhibit C presents the round-trip trades arising from the buy and sell transactions in Exhibit A 
using LIFO matching. The difference from the FIFO matching procedure is that under LIFO, when a 
transaction in the opposite direction enters the queue, we match it with the most recent (rather than the 
earliest) existing transaction in the queue.  
Exhibit C: LIFO-matched round-trip trades  
 Symbol  | client_mgr | tradedate  | matchtradedate | volume | rtdays |  bp   |  sp    
--------+------------+------------+----------------+--------+--------+-------+------ 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-12-16     | 500    | 68     | 86.22 | 75.27 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-12-16     | 300    | 68     | 86.22 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-12-15     | 600    | 69     | 82.90 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-12-15     | 400    | 69     | 81.72 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-05-11     | 600    | 221    | 59.47 | 75.14 
 AMGN   | 515_131    | 1999-03-25 | 1998-05-11     | 500    | 226    | 58.33 | 75.14 
 
As in this example, the FIFO and LIFO methodologies generally lead to different round-trip trade 
matching.12 We conduct all of our analyses on both sets of round-trip trades, and where the results for 
FIFO- and LIFO-based round-trip trades differ materially we present and discuss both.  
We note that the Ancerno dataset has no information on a fund’s holdings at any time; only 
transactions are reported to Ancerno. Our method effectively initializes each symbol-clientcode-
clientmgrcode combination with zero shares, and we discard the first two years of the dataset to minimize 
the effect the initialization may have on our identification of round-trip trades. All of our analyses are 
based on round-trip trades from the sample period January 1999 to December 2009.  
We apply the following filters to remove potentially misleading or erroneous trades. We discard 
all trades with clientcode equal to zero, which indicates that Ancerno cannot reliably track the fund over 
time. We also discard trades with buy price or sell price less than one cent. To ensure that the number of 
shares traded and the trade prices are comparable between the buy and sell dates, we exclude round-trip 
trades in which the buy and sell dates straddle a stock split date, e.g., the stock was bought before a split 
                                                            
12 The two methods would yield identical sets of round-trip trades only if a fund executes either only one buy and one sell 
transaction in a stock or alternating buy and sell transactions of identical size for the entire period, which rarely occurs in 
practice.  
     
  15
date and sold after the split date.13 Approximately 6% of the FIFO round-trip trades (5% of the LIFO 
round-trip trades) are eliminated from our sample by this screen; fewer LIFO trades are eliminated 
because they tend to be shorter and span fewer of the stock split dates. 
3.2. Calculating Returns 
We calculate the raw return for each round-trip trade as the percentage price change over the 
holding period. We also calculate a market-adjusted return for each round-trip trade by subtracting the 
return on the S&P 500 index over the trade holding period from the round-trip trade’s raw return.  
3.3. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of round-trip trades and for the 
subsample of trades made by funds that are present in the Ancerno universe for at least five years. A 
natural concern when analyzing trade holding periods is whether the incidence of short-duration trades is 
unduly influenced by the presence of funds that remain in the universe for only a short period of time. For 
example, we cannot observe round-trip trades longer than one year for a fund that is in the universe for 
only one year. Of the 4053 unique funds appearing in the universe between 1999 and 2009, 1059 funds 
are present for only one year or less, and 1186 funds are present for five or more years. In Table 1 we 
present descriptive statistics for both the full sample of 4053 funds and the subsample of 1186 funds that 
are present for at least five years, which are the focus of our study; in the remainder of the paper we 
present results only for the sample of funds present for at least five years.  
[Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the 4053 funds in the full sample belong to 772 distinct 
institutions; the subsample of 1186 funds present for five or more years belong to 324 distinct institutions. 
                                                            
13 From CRSP, we identify 4800 stock splits and stock dividends (CRSP DISTCD = 5523, 5533, 5543) involving 2795 stocks 
in our sample. (See Appendix for details of matching Ancerno data to CRSP.) We note that the inclusion of dividend 
distributions in this filtering treatment is a conservative approach. If managers typically keep the shares they receive as a stock 
dividend, retaining trades straddling dividend dates will affect the quantity in the calculation of round-trip trades; however, if 
managers automatically convert dividend distributions into cash, stock dividends would be immaterial to our round-trip trade 
calculations. Since we cannot identify which action specific managers adopt with respect to stock dividends, we discard all 
round-trip trades straddling stock dividend distributions as well as stock splits. 
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In both samples the median institution has three funds. In the full sample, there are over 329 billion shares 
and over $10 trillion in round-trip trades.14 Although only 29% of the funds in Ancerno are present for 
five or more years (1186 of the 4053 funds), they account for about 89% of the share volume and dollar 
volume in the full sample. These long-lived funds also trade over 96% of the stocks traded in the full 
sample. In both the full sample and the subsample of funds present five or more years, the majority of the 
funds are pension funds, but the majority of trading is done by money managers. For example, among the 
funds present five or more years, money managers represent only 7% of the funds but account for over 
93% of the share volume traded. We analyze money managers and pension funds separately because their 
differences may lead to different inference (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992).  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the trades in both the full sample and the subsample of funds 
present for five or more years are heavily weighted towards large-capitalization stocks. Over 80% of the 
share volume in each sample occurs in stocks in the two largest market-capitalization deciles, while less 
than 0.5% of the share volume occurs in the two smallest deciles. This pattern of institutional trading 
volume being concentrated in large-cap stocks is consistent with the literature on institutional holdings. 
For example, Lewellen (2011) finds that between 1980 and 2007, large-cap stocks (above the NYSE 80th 
percentile) account for over 80% of institutional holdings, while micro-cap stocks (below the NYSE 20th 
percentile) constitute about 1% of total institutional holdings.  
Before turning to the analysis of how long institutions hold their trades, it is useful to consider 
what we already know about institutional turnover. Table 2 presents mean and median fund turnover 
statistics for mutual funds for the length of our sample period and for pension funds for most of the 
period.15 The time-series averages of the mean and median turnover percentages in both types of 
institutional funds are below 100%, with pension funds generally exhibiting lower turnover than mutual 
                                                            
14 We note that the number of round-trip trades, also reported in the table for completeness, may not be as informative as the 
volume statistics, both because the average size of equity trades falls considerably during the sample period (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2011) and because in some cases our identification of round-trip trades counts orders that are executed in 
multiple pieces as separate trades. Hvidkjaer (2008) provides evidence that institutions increasingly engage in order splitting 
strategies resulting in more small trades originating from large institutional investors. 
15 The pension fund dataset provided by Mobius Group, from which we derive these statistics, ends in 2008. 
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funds. But there may be considerable dispersion in trade holding periods within and across funds. For 
example, a turnover rate of 100% could arise from a fund trading all of its positions once a year, or 
trading half of its positions twice a year and not trading the other half of its positions, or a wide array of 
other combinations of short- and long-duration trades. Clearly, the greater the dispersion of trade 
durations that make up a turnover rate, the less informative is the turnover rate about trade durations.16 
Our dataset of round-trip trades at the fund level provides a window into the trade durations behind fund 
turnover numbers.  
[Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the breakdown of institutional round-trip trades by holding period, from less 
than one day to four or more years. Panel A shows the breakdown for round-trip trades identified using 
the FIFO method, and Panel B shows analogous breakdowns using the LIFO method. The columns 
labeled “Aggregate Shares” in each panel report holding-period share percentages calculated across all 
trades in each sample. A significant portion of trades are held for short holding periods. For example, 
using the FIFO method (Panel A), over 7% of share volume occurs in trades with round-trip durations of 
less than one month and over 23% of share volume occurs in round-trip trades lasting less than three 
months (see Aggregate Shares, Cumulative % column). Using the LIFO method to identify round-trip 
trades results in even more short-duration trades, mainly for the mechanical reason that the LIFO method 
matches a transaction to its most recent preceding opposite-side transaction, rather than the longest-ago 
opposite-side transaction under FIFO. Panel B shows that, using the LIFO method, over 32% of share 
volume occurs in trades held less than one month and over 51% in trades held less than three months 
(Aggregate Shares, Cumulative % column). Within these categories, the incidence of trades lasting less 
than one day (0.32% of FIFO and 6.37% of LIFO share volume) is particularly surprising for institutional 
money manager and pension fund portfolios. 
                                                            
16 Investment Management Association (2011) points out that both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its 
European equivalent explicitly state that a fund’s turnover rate is meant only to give investors a sense of how portfolio turnover 
and resulting transaction costs affect fund performance, not to give an indication of trade holding periods. 
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Further insight is provided by the cross-sectional fund-level statistics in the last four columns of 
Table 3, which report the mean and median across the individual funds’ cumulative percentages. While 
the mean and median fund-level cumulative percentages are broadly in line with the aggregate cumulative 
percentages, money managers on average do more short-duration trades than pension funds, and the 
shortest duration trades are clearly more concentrated in a smaller number of funds.17 For example, Panel 
B shows that in aggregate 17.45% of share volume occurs in LIFO trades held less than one week (Panel 
B, Aggregate shares, Cumulative %), but the average money manager and pension funds, respectively, 
have only 8.77% and 2.35% of their share volume in trades held less than one week. Because our 
hypotheses concern the behavior of individual fund managers, our subsequent analysis will focus on fund-
level behavior.  
[Table 3 here] 
Together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that although the average trade holding period (reflected in 
turnover statistics in Table 2) for institutional funds is much longer, many institutional money managers 
undertake a significant number of short duration trades (Table 3). Fig. 1 provides further insight into the 
prevalence of short-duration trades at the fund level. The incidence of short-duration trades is not driven 
by only a few extremely active funds in the Ancerno universe: Of the 1186 funds that are present for five 
or more years, only 42 of the funds engage in no round-trip trades lasting less than one month based on 
the FIFO method of identifying round-trip trades (top graph). Of the other 1144 funds, trades lasting less 
than one month account for up to 10% of trading volume in 994 funds, 10% to 20% of trading in 106 
funds, and over 20% in the remaining 44 funds. The remaining graphs in Fig. 1 depict the analogous fund 
frequency distributions for trades defined under the LIFO method and for trade holding periods of less 
than three months.  
[Fig. 1 here] 
                                                            
17 Note that the aggregate share measures simply sum across all shares traded, irrespective of the funds in which they occur, so 
they are not equal to a weighted average of the mean for money managers and the mean for pension funds.  
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Why do institutional fund managers engage in these short-duration trades? The evidence on the 
relation between turnover and performance is mixed. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) document a positive relation between turnover and portfolio performance, 
while Carhart (1997) finds a negative relation between turnover and net mutual fund returns. At the stock 
level, Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that, on average, low 
turnover stocks earn higher returns than high turnover stocks. In the following two sections we examine 
several hypotheses regarding the frequency and returns of trades with different holding periods in an 
attempt to understand why institutions that generally hold long-term portfolios engage in short-duration 
trades.  
4. Informed optimizer results 
This section examines the hypotheses that are derived from the notion of the institutional fund 
manager as an informed optimizer. If fund managers behave as informed optimizers, we expect to see 
shorter trade holding periods when market volatility is higher and when fund flow volatility is higher. We 
also expect to see longer trade holding periods for stocks that are more illiquid, and no relation between 
holding period and trade return.  
Table 4 presents the results from Fama-MacBeth style regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) of 
fund-level trade holding periods on market volatility (measured by the volatility of the S&P 500 index), 
fund flow volatility (measured by the volatility of Lipper mutual fund flows), illiquidity (measured by the 
Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2013, FHT illiquidity measure), and trade return, controlling for trade size 
relative to a fund’s average trade size. All of the explanatory variables are standardized (by subtracting 
the variable’s mean and dividing by its standard deviation), so coefficient estimates indicate the change in 
holding period in days for a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variable. We run a separate 
regression for each of the 1186 funds, then report the mean coefficient values and related statistics across 
the 84 money manager funds (left columns) and the 1102 pension funds (right columns). Panel A presents 
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the results for FIFO-based round-trip trades, and Panel B presents the results for LIFO-based round-trip 
trades.  
[Table 4 here] 
The relation between market volatility and trade holding period is negative for pension funds, 
consistent with the informed optimizer prediction, but insignificant for money managers. Contrary to the 
informed optimizer prediction, both money managers and pension funds have longer trade holding 
periods when mutual fund flow volatility is higher. In terms of liquidity, we find no support for the 
informed optimizer prediction of longer holding periods for more illiquid stocks: Money manager FIFO 
trades and both LIFO and FIFO trades of pension funds have shorter holding periods for more illiquid 
stocks, while money manager LIFO trades show an insignificant relation between holding period and 
stock illiquidity. Finally, we find a strong positive relation between trade return and trade holding period, 
contrary to the informed optimizer prediction that fund managers should choose the most profitable 
holding period for each trade, leading to no relation between holding period and return. Not only is the 
relation between return and holding period strongly positive, it is also the largest coefficient among all of 
the explanatory variables in each regression.18   
5. Behavioral rent-seeker results  
In this section we examine predictions derived from the depiction of fund managers as behavioral 
rent-seekers. We first examine the distribution of short-duration trades during the year, and then move on 
to analyze in more detail the positive relation between trade returns and trade holding periods that 
emerged above.  
Fig. 2 presents the calendar-month distribution of trades that are held for less than one month as a 
percentage of all trades initiated in the month. While the informed optimizer model does not predict any 
seasonality in trade holding periods, some behavioral rent-seeker explanations could give rise to 
                                                            
18 Because the explanatory variables are standardized, the relative magnitude of their coefficients can be compared across 
explanatory variables.  
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seasonality in the distribution of trade durations. For example, window dressing would be expected to 
induce more trading near year-end, which could lead to a higher proportion of short-duration trades if the 
positions are held only temporarily. Fig. 2 shows that the amount of observed seasonality depends on the 
type of fund, with money managers showing an increase in short-duration trades in the fourth quarter and 
pension funds showing less variation across months. The two graphs in Fig. 2 also show that the 
seasonality is sensitive to the method used to identify round-trip trades, with more seasonality apparent 
under the FIFO than under the LIFO method. (As in the tables, the money manager and pension fund 
values report the mean values across funds, which do not average to the aggregate trade statistics.) 
Overall the prevalence of short-term trades does not appear to be explained by calendar-related trading, 
and the data offer no support for theories of portfolio management that predict trading and holding 
periods are driven by calendar effects.  
[Fig. 2 here] 
While the informed optimizer depiction of institutional fund managers predicts no relation 
between trade holding periods and returns, the behavioral rent-seeker depiction suggests several possible 
relations. The disposition effect predicts that institutional managers will sell winners and hold on to 
losers, which would result in higher returns for shorter-duration trades and lower (or negative) returns on 
longer-duration trades. In contrast, the overconfidence hypothesis suggests that short-duration trades 
should have low returns, as overconfident managers tend to trade frequently but unprofitably. Short-
duration trades undertaken to show that fund managers are active are also expected to have low returns, as 
they are executed for reasons unrelated to profit maximization and on average are likely to lose the bid-
ask spread.  
Table 5 presents average raw returns (Panel A) and market-adjusted returns (Panel B) for round-
trip trades by their holding periods; trade returns are weighted by principal amount (initial share price 
times number of shares) within each holding period category. The column of each panel labeled 
“Aggregate Trade Returns” reports average raw and market-adjusted returns across all trades in each 
holding period category. The last eight columns of each panel (labeled “Fund-level Trade Returns”) 
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examine the dispersion of trade returns across funds. We calculate the raw and market-adjusted returns for 
the trades of each fund in each holding period category and present the mean and median fund returns for 
trades in each duration bucket, separately for money managers and pension funds. We report returns as 
the percentage price change in the stock based on transaction prices (which include the bid-ask spread), 
ignoring explicit transaction costs such as commissions, so the returns calculated here should be viewed 
as the upper limit on a trade’s true profit.  
[Table 5 here] 
The aggregate trade returns columns in Table 5 show that with the exception of intraday trades, 
the average raw and market-adjusted returns are generally lower for trades held less than two years than 
for trades held longer than two years. Furthermore, average returns for trades held longer than one day 
and less than one year are generally negative, even on a market-adjusted basis. The fund-level trade 
returns columns show that the mean and median returns across the short-duration trades of funds are also 
negative except for the intraday trades.19 The results in Table 5 do not support the informed optimizer 
prediction of equal returns across trade holding periods. Neither do the results show much evidence of the 
disposition effect, i.e., that managers sell winners and hold onto losers; however, it is worth noting that 
our interpretation of the disposition effect assumes that the purchase price is the reference point.20 The 
results are broadly consistent with the overconfidence hypothesis of managers trading frequently and 
unprofitably, but they could also reflect the agency costs of short-duration trades undertaken for reasons 
such as to show that managers are active. Overall, the pattern of returns raises an important question: 
Why are institutional investors engaging in so many short-duration trades, which do not appear to 
                                                            
19 Our finding of negative returns on short-term trades is distinct from Puckett and Yan’s (2011) finding that fund managers 
exhibit positive trading skill within calendar quarters. The key difference between Puckett and Yan’s analysis and ours is that 
we are interested in trade holding periods, while Puckett and Yan are specifically interested in intra-quarter trading. This 
distinction leads to different trade classifications in our study versus theirs. For example, a trade initiated on January 15 and 
closed out on March 15 the same year would be considered an interim round-trip trade by Puckett and Yan (2011), but a trade 
initiated on March 15 and closed out on May 15 the same year would not; both trades would be categorized as two-month 
trades in our study. Conversely, a trade initiated on March 15 and closed out on September 15 the same year would be marked 
to market on March 31 in Puckett and Yan’s interim trading performance measure; in our study, the trade would be categorized 
as a six-month trade and would not be marked to market on March 31.      
20 Our results are consistent with Ben-David and Hirshleifer’s (2012) finding that, contrary to the standard predictions of the 
disposition effect, at short holding periods individual investors are more likely to sell stocks with big losses than those with 
small losses.   
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generate positive returns and appear inconsistent with our general impression of institutional money 
managers and pension funds as long-term investors with low turnover?  
One potential explanation is that fund managers may unwind loss-making trades early because 
they receive new information suggesting that the trades will be even more unprofitable over the longer 
term, so they “cut their losses.” To examine this possibility, in Table 6 we perform the following 
simulation. For each trade that is held for less than one month in Table 5, we calculate what its return 
would have been if it had been held for a full year (the point where the average fund-level return turns 
positive in Table 5). For example, if a trade was initiated on January 15, 2006, and closed out on February 
1, 2006, we calculate its hypothetical return if it had instead been held from January 15, 2006 to January 
15, 2007.  
[Table 6 here] 
The results in Table 6 show that both in aggregate and at the fund level, the mean and median 
trades that were actually held less than one month would have produced a positive return had they been 
held for a full year. This suggests that the negative returns earned on short-duration trades are not 
explained by fund managers cutting their losses in light of new information they receive shortly after they 
initiate trades.  
Although short-duration trades do not earn positive returns on average, some funds do earn 
positive returns in each holding period category (e.g., in Table 5 the 75th percentile is positive in most 
holding period categories), which could be due to trading skill, information, or simply luck. To examine 
the extent to which information or skill can explain the fund-level results, we examine the persistence of 
funds’ short-duration trade performance in Table 7.  
[Table 7 here] 
Table 7 presents the results of tests for return persistence for short-duration trades at the fund 
level. In each semiannual period we sort funds into quintiles based on their performance for short-
duration trades held less than one day (Panels A and B) or less than three months (Panels C and D). Note 
that the returns reported are for a particular category of trades within each fund, not for the fund’s overall 
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performance.21 We report the average market-adjusted return for funds in each quintile in the base 
semiannual period (when the funds are assigned to quintiles) and in the four subsequent semiannual 
periods. For example, Panel B shows that the best-performing quintile of pension funds in trades lasting 
less than one day earned an average of 7.10% in the base period (Panel B, Q5 row, Base period column), 
while the worst-performing quintile of funds earned an average of -5.30% (Panel B, Q1 row, Base period 
column). The difference of 12.41% between the best and worst-performing quintiles is statistically 
significant, with a t-statistic of 8.1. Although the differences are smaller in subsequent semiannual 
periods, they are statistically significant one and three periods later, suggesting that pension funds do 
benefit from persistent skill or information advantages in their shortest-duration trades. The subsequent 
outperformance is driven by the outperformance of funds in Quintile 5, while the Quintile 1 funds exhibit 
subsequent returns that are not significantly different from zero. Panel A shows less return persistence for 
the intraday trades of money managers, with return differences not significantly different from zero in the 
four semiannual periods following quintile formation. The weaker significance for money managers may 
in part reflect the small number of money managers in the sample: 84 money managers versus 1102 
pension funds.  
Panels C and D of Table 7 present analogous tests for money managers and pension funds based 
on trades lasting less than three months. Short-duration trade return persistence continues to be stronger 
for pension funds, though the broader definition of short-duration trades reveals significant persistence for 
money managers, too. In contrast to the intraday trades (Panels A and B), for trades held less than three 
months (Panels C and D), the subsequent outperformance of Quintile 5 over Quintile 1 is generally driven 
by the underperformance of funds in Quintile 1. Panels C and D show that those funds with the least skill 
in trades lasting less than three months generally continue to exhibit poor returns in the subsequent four 
semiannual periods, which suggests that overconfidence or trading to appear active is also persistent and 
often involves money-losing trades.  
                                                            
21 Because we do not have information about a fund’s holdings, only its transactions, we cannot calculate a fund’s overall 
performance.  
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The return persistence demonstrated by funds’ short-duration trades in Table 7 is consistent with 
both Odean’s (1999) overconfidence theory and Dow and Gorton’s (1997) agency theory of trading to 
appear active. To further investigate the overconfidence explanation, we examine the link between returns 
and subsequent short-duration trading activity. When combined with attribution bias, overconfidence 
predicts that following a period of high (low) realized returns, investors mistakenly attribute the returns to 
their own skill and as a consequence tend to trade more (less) in subsequent periods (Gervais and Odean, 
2001). In contrast, trading to appear active predicts no relation between returns and subsequent trading 
activity. In Table 8 we sort funds into quintiles based on their short-duration trade returns in the base 
period (as in Table 7), but we report the average percentage of short-duration trading (rather than the trade 
returns) in each subsequent period in the table. In most cases the amount of short-duration trading is not 
higher in subsequent periods for funds with the highest base-period returns (Quintile 5) than for funds 
with the lowest base-period returns (Quintile 1). The only three subsequent-period observations with 
significant Quintile 5 minus Quintile 1 differences occur for money managers and provide mixed results: 
for trades held less than one day (Panel A) the difference is significantly positive two periods after the 
base period (consistent with overconfidence), but for trades held less than three months (Panel C) the 
difference is significantly negative two and four periods after the base period. Overall, the picture that 
emerges suggests that whatever overconfidence fund managers may be exhibiting is not directly related to 
attribution bias.  
 [Table 8 here] 
6. Robustness checks  
Results for the full sample of funds in the Ancerno universe (4053 funds) are qualitatively similar 
to those presented in the paper (which are based on the 1186 funds present for five or more years), with 
the exception that the full sample implies that a larger proportion of trades are short-duration, because 
funds that are present for only a short period of time can contribute only short-duration trades. For 
brevity, in most tables we present only results using the FIFO method to identify round-trip trades; results 
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using the LIFO method yield identical inference except where both FIFO and LIFO results are presented. 
Results are not driven by the financial crisis of 2008; all results are qualitatively similar when 2008 is 
dropped from the sample period. Alternative measures of market-wide volatility including the VIX index 
and range-based measures of S&P 500 index volatility yield qualitatively similar results. Using the 
Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity leads to qualitatively similar results to those based on the FHT 
measure of illiquidity presented here. Defining short-duration trades alternatively as trades held for less 
than one week or less than one month does not change the inference from the return persistence or 
overconfidence analyses (Tables 7 and 8). All results involving trades held for up to one week, up to one 
month, and up to three months are robust to dropping intraday trades.  
We also investigate the extent to which cross-trading (also called internalization) among funds in 
the same institution may explain our results. Chaudhuri, Ivkovic, and Trzcinka (2013) find evidence that 
institutions cross-trade in order to benefit one fund at the expense of another, behavior about which the 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor has expressed serious 
concern (U.S. Department of Labor, 1998). We define potential cross-trades as instances where the same 
stock is bought by one fund and sold by another fund belonging to the same institution, at the same price 
on the same day. Potential cross-trades account for less than 0.001% of the total share volume in our 
sample, and excluding them from our analyses does not change our results.  
7. Conclusion  
This is the first study to examine a wide range of holding periods of institutional investors, from 
intraday trades to those held for multiple years. Analyzing the daily U.S. equity trades of 1186 
institutional funds present in the Ancerno database for at least five years, we identify holding periods and 
returns of over 105 million round-trip trades between 1999 and 2009, with a total volume of over 292 
billion shares. We find wide dispersion in trade holding periods. All of the institutional funds execute 
round-trip trades lasting more than a year, and 96% of them also execute trades lasting less than one 
month. In aggregate over 7% of volume occurs in trades that are held for less than one month (23% are 
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held for less than three months). Within the less-than-one-month category are a significant number of 
trades that are held for less than a week and even less than one day. The prevalence of short-duration 
trades appears surprising in light of the typically low turnover rates for mutual funds and pension funds.  
We contrast two views of institutional funds in the literature. The first view is that institutional 
investors are either more informed than the market or are trying to build portfolios on the efficient set, or 
both. This is essentially the view that funds are rational and acting in the interest of their shareholders. 
The second view is that neither is true. Studies that take this view either find that agency costs 
characterize fund trading or that portfolio managers are subject to behavioral biases. We draw out the 
implications of the first view for portfolio holding periods and hypothesize that higher market volatility, 
fund flow volatility, and stock liquidity will be related to shorter holding periods, and returns will not be 
related to holding periods. In cross-sectional regressions we find that the pattern of holding periods 
appears broadly inconsistent with the predictions of a model of institutional investors as rational informed 
optimizers. Holding periods are negatively related to volatility for pension funds (as predicted) but are 
positively related to volatility for money managers. Holding periods are positively related to fund flow 
volatility, stock liquidity, and trade returns, all in contrast to the predictions of informed optimization. We 
find that most short-duration trades do not generate high returns; on the contrary, the average returns for 
trades held less than a year are mostly negative. Our analysis of trade returns at the fund level shows that 
while the mean and median funds do not earn positive returns on short-duration trades other than intraday 
trades, some funds do earn positive returns on short-duration trades and their returns tend to persist, 
suggesting some benefit from trading skill and/or information. But other funds exhibit persistent poor 
performance in short-duration trades, consistent with managers who are overconfident or trading to 
appear active.  
This evidence clearly calls for more research. It is inconsistent both with the common view in 
corporate finance that institutions are informed and with the view by asset pricing models that stocks are 
predominantly held in efficient portfolios. Our data are limited in that we cannot associate trades with the 
total assets in a fund or other fund characteristics. Thus the portfolio as a whole could be characterized 
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differently than the active trades we observe. However, there is no question that our evidence of agency 
costs and sub-optimal trading suggests that the description of institutional fund managers as informed, 
rational optimizers is at best imperfect. 
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Appendix A: Matching Ancerno trade records to CRSP data  
Although the Ancerno data include identifiers for each stock, the variables named “ticker” and 
“cusip” are not the same as those used in databases such as CRSP, and different Ancerno clients report 
different tickers and cusips for the same stock. Ancerno provides a unique identifier for each stock – the 
stockkey – but this identifier is not present in CRSP. Because there is no linking variable that joins the 
CRSP and Ancerno data, we use a multi-step process to match firms in the Ancerno database to firms in 
the CRSP database. For every date, ticker, cusip, and stockkey combination in Ancerno, we match the 
Ancerno ticker to the CRSP permno using the ticker and cusip. For stockkey assignments that match 
multiple tickers, we generate a list of all the variations of the ticker symbol in Ancerno and match it to the 
most likely valid ticker from CRSP. For example, for the ticker AAPL in CRSP, Ancerno has AAPL, 
AAPL.OQ, AAPL US, AAPL.O, AAPL.NC, and several others. For all non-strict matches (in this 
example, AAPL.OQ, AAPL US, AAPL.O, and AAPL.NC), we compare the prices of the ticker AAPL to 
these other ticker symbol variations. If they exactly match in price on the same date, we assume that these 
are the same security – AAPL. Using this logic, we create a master file that produces a one-to-one match 
between each Ancerno stockkey and CRSP permno. We use this linking master file to merge the Ancerno 
records on daily institutional transactions to CRSP data.  
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Appendix B: Implementation of double-clustered standard errors  
Short-duration round-trip trade returns may be correlated over time and/or across funds or stocks, 
so using standard t-statistics may overstate significance. To account for dependencies both in the cross 
section and over time, all of the t-statistics reported in our analyses are based on standards errors that are 
clustered on both time and fund (or stock), following Thompson (2011). In this appendix we outline how 
we implement the double-clustered standard errors for trades or funds within a single quintile and then for 
tests of the differences between trades or funds in the top versus bottom quintile. We illustrate the 
methodology using the example of the return persistence analysis in Table 7, which includes both 
individual quintile and quintile difference tests.22  
Individual quintile. For the funds in each quintile, we run the following regression: 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௙,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߝ௙,௧		,																	ሺ3ሻ 
where Returnf,t is the average return for short-duration trades in fund f in semiannual period t;  is a 
constant, and f,t is the error term. The estimated  is the average value, and its t-statistic is computed 
using the double-clustered standard error methodology of Thompson (2011), clustering on fund (f) and 
semiannual period (t).  
Difference between quintiles. We first stack all of the Returnf,t observations for Quintile 1 and 
Quintile 5 into one panel, adding a new variable Topf,t which is equal to 1 for observations from Quintile 
5, else zero. We then run the following regression: 
ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௙,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚܶ݋݌௙,௧ ൅ 	ߝ௙,௧		.																					ሺ4ሻ 
The estimated coefficient  is the average difference, and the t-statistic for  is computed using the 
double-clustered standard error methodology of Thompson (2011), clustering on fund (f) and semiannual 
period (t).  
                                                            
22 Code for calculating the standard errors can be derived from Thompson (2011) or is available on request from the authors, 
who thank Andy Puckett for sharing his code with them as well.  
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Table 1
Sample descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Funds, institutions, and round-trip trades
Full Sample
Number of funds 4,053
    Pension funds 3,811
    Money managers 242
Number of institutions 772
Median number of funds per institution 3
Total share volume of round-trip trades (billion) 329.66
    Pension funds 30.29
    Money managers 299.37
Total dollar volume of round-trip trades ($ trillion) 10.12
    Pension funds 0.91
    Money managers 9.21
Total number of round-trip trades (million) 121.24
    Pension funds 9.53
    Money managers 111.71
Total number of stocks traded 9,737
Panel B: Distribution of round-trip trades by stock market capitalization decile
% Share 
Volume
% Dollar 
Volume % Trades
% Share 
Volume
% Dollar 
Volume % Trades
0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03
0.11 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.09
0.26 0.08 0.28 0.26 0.08 0.23
0.63 0.19 0.75 0.62 0.19 0.68
1.25 0.50 1.64 1.26 0.50 1.56
2.24 1.03 3.02 2.21 1.01 2.90
4.05 2.24 5.30 4.01 2.21 5.07
7.37 4.89 8.92 7.30 4.84 8.61
15.21 11.97 14.97 15.14 11.87 14.49
68.85 79.04 64.95 69.06 79.26 66.35
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
105.74
9,407
273.12
0.55
8.42
6.26
99.47
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and 
December 31, 2009. The table presents statistics for all FIFO round-trip trades in common stocks for the 
entire universe of pension and money manger funds reporting to Ancerno (Full Sample ) and the subset of 
funds that are present in the Ancerno database for five or more years (Funds present 5 or more years ).  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the two samples, and Panel B presents the distribution of round-
trip trades for each sample by stock market capitalization decile. Market capitalization deciles are 
determined from CRSP, based on the market capitalization of each stock at the end of the year prior to the 
initiation of the trade.  
D3
Full Sample Funds present 5 or more years 
Funds present 5 or more 
years
1,186
1,102
84
324
3
292.05
18.93
Decile
D1 (Smallest)
D2
8.97
D10 (Largest)
D4
D5
D6
D7
D8
D9
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Table 2
Turnover statistics for institutional fund managers.
Year Mean Turnover % Median Turnover % Mean Turnover % Median Turnover %
1999 93.4 70 66.8 45
2000 100.5 75 67.5 45
2001 106.8 77 74.6 46
2002 102.7 71 73.5 46
2003 91.7 65 73.1 44
2004 83.9 62 63.8 45
2005 82.7 62 61.6 43
2006 81.2 64 61.6 42
2007 80.6 62 62.3 45
2008 93.5 69 65.8 46
2009 95.4 69 n/a n/a
Average 92.0 67.8 67.2 44.5
Mutual Funds Pension Funds
The table presents fund turnover statistics for mutual funds, calculated from the CRSP Survivorship-free Mutual 
Fund database, and for pension funds, calculated from quarterly surveys provided by Mobius Group (subsumed by 
Informa PSN after 2008).
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Table 3
Round-trip trades by holding period.
 
Panel A: FIFO round-trip trades 
 
At least Less than % Cumulative % Mean Median Mean Median
 1 day 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.00
1 day 1 week 1.38 1.70 1.60 1.17 1.52 0.31
1 week 1 month 5.78 7.48 7.43 6.11 5.38 3.54
1 month 2 months 7.97 15.45 15.43 14.46 11.92 9.55
2 months 3 months 7.85 23.30 23.29 23.21 18.66 16.15
3 months 4 months 7.47 30.76 30.50 29.96 25.23 23.38
4 months 5 months 6.80 37.56 37.05 36.91 31.28 30.25
5 months 6 months 6.00 43.57 42.93 42.85 36.72 36.34
6 months 9 months 14.75 58.32 57.23 58.44 50.68 52.36
9 months 1 year 10.56 68.87 67.73 70.23 61.36 64.52
1 year 2 years 19.71 88.58 88.95 90.62 84.34 89.04
2 years 3 years 6.72 95.29 95.99 97.03 93.30 96.61
3 years 4 years 2.63 97.92 98.41 99.18 97.10 99.24
4 years 2.08 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: LIFO round-trip trades 
 
At least Less than % Cumulative % Mean Median Mean Median
1 day 6.37 6.37 2.14 1.33 0.39 0.00
1 day 1 week 11.08 17.45 8.77 6.79 2.35 0.84
1 week 1 month 15.04 32.49 21.72 19.57 8.75 6.38
1 month 2 months 11.13 43.62 33.05 31.72 17.68 15.26
2 months 3 months 7.88 51.51 41.75 41.86 25.78 23.94
3 months 4 months 6.14 57.64 48.68 49.48 33.05 31.93
4 months 5 months 4.98 62.62 54.57 56.19 39.31 39.35
5 months 6 months 4.11 66.73 59.30 61.51 44.81 45.27
6 months 9 months 8.98 75.71 70.06 73.01 58.02 61.08
9 months 1 year 6.04 81.75 77.69 80.18 67.62 71.94
1 year 2 years 11.15 92.90 92.14 93.35 86.96 90.81
2 years 3 years 3.94 96.84 96.85 97.40 94.22 96.90
3 years 4 years 1.71 98.55 98.70 99.27 97.48 99.20
4 years 1.45 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by 
funds in the database for five or more years. Panel A presents statistics based on round-trip trades defined using FIFO 
methodology; Panel B presents statistics based on round-trip trades defined using LIFO methodology. Holding period 
refers to the time between when a trade is initiated and when it is unwound. The  columns labeled Aggregate Shares 
present percentages calculated across all round-trip trades in each category; the columns labeled Fund-level Cumulative 
Percentages  present statistics about the cumulative percentages of share volume in trades with holding periods less than 
or equal to the period specified, across the funds in each sample. 
Fund-level Cumulative Percentages (%)
Holding Period Aggregate Shares Money Managers Pension Funds
Holding Period Aggregate Shares Money Managers Pension Funds
Fund-level Cumulative Percentages (%)
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Table 4
Fama-MacBeth regression results.
Panel A: FIFO round-trip trades 
Mean StdDev t-stat p-value Mean StdDev t-stat p-value
Market Volatility 3.3 37.6 0.80 0.4258 -23.9 57.5 -13.80 0.0000
Fund Flow Volatility 16.8 23.7 6.49 0.0000 17.2 54.7 10.44 0.0000
Stock Illiquidity -5.9 23.1 -2.36 0.0206 -24.5 73.6 -11.05 0.0000
Trade Return 22.4 65.8 3.12 0.0025 26.3 75.9 11.48 0.0000
Relative Trade Size -10.5 24.6 -3.89 0.0002 -11.8 35.1 -11.21 0.0000
Constant 245.8 77.5 29.06 0.0000 284.9 136.0 69.58 0.0000
Number of Funds 84 1102
Panel B: LIFO round-trip trades 
Mean StdDev t-stat p-value Mean StdDev t-stat p-value
Market Volatility 2.8 25.2 1.01 0.3135 -21.2 52.4 -13.44 0.0000
Fund Flow Volatility 9.5 16.6 5.28 0.0000 14.3 52.3 9.10 0.0000
Stock Illiquidity -1.9 23.1 -0.75 0.4567 -15.6 60.6 -8.52 0.0000
Trade Return 14.2 60.3 2.16 0.0334 22.5 70.3 10.62 0.0000
Relative Trade Size 2.9 19.4 1.35 0.1802 -4.9 35.7 -4.60 0.0000
Constant 155.0 52.9 26.87 0.0000 241.7 120.9 66.39 0.0000
Number of Funds 84 1102
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by 
funds in the database for five or more years. The table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth style regressions of holding 
periods for FIFO trades on several explanatory variables. Panel A presents results based on round-trip trades defined using 
FIFO methodology; Panel B presents results based on round-trip trades defined using LIFO methodology. Regressions are 
run separately for each fund, and cross-sectional statistics are presented for Money Managers (left panel) and Pension Funds 
(right panel).  Holding period  (the dependent variable) is measured as the number of trading days between the time the trade 
is entered into and when it is closed out. All explanatory variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation, so coefficients represent the change in holding period for a one standard deviation change in the 
explanatory variable. Market Volatility  is the volatility of the S&P 500 index in the month the trade is closed out. Fund 
Flow Volatility  is the volatility of the Lipper mutual fund flows in the month the trade is closed out.  Stock Illiquidity  is the 
FHT measure in the month the trade is closed out. Trade Return  is the percentage price change over the trade holding 
period. Relative Trade Size, a control variable, is the ratio of the trade's size to the average trade size for the fund.
Money Managers Pension Funds
Money Managers Pension Funds
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Table 5
Trade returns by holding period.
 
Panel A: Raw returns
 
At least Less than Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile
 1 day 0.02 0.17 -0.01 -0.14 0.22 1.18 0.06 -0.21 1.26
1 day 1 week -1.00 -0.82 -0.54 -1.51 0.36 -1.52 -0.54 -4.14 1.94
1 week 1 month -2.72 -2.06 -1.56 -3.81 -0.44 -3.14 -2.48 -7.46 1.29
1 month 2 months -3.99 -0.80 -2.36 -5.18 0.58 -3.07 -2.59 -7.65 2.15
2 months 3 months -5.22 -2.64 -2.94 -6.59 0.41 -3.37 -3.41 -8.82 2.13
3 months 4 months -4.88 -3.24 -3.37 -6.95 -0.27 -3.12 -2.82 -8.86 2.76
4 months 5 months -5.07 -2.85 -3.75 -6.56 0.13 -2.93 -2.85 -9.60 3.40
5 months 6 months -5.32 -2.87 -3.30 -7.50 0.13 -2.35 -2.37 -9.60 4.35
6 months 9 months -4.79 -1.89 -1.94 -7.51 1.69 -2.11 -1.48 -8.52 4.59
9 months 1 year -4.36 -2.10 -1.07 -7.89 3.20 -0.97 -0.56 -8.71 6.81
1 year 2 years -2.31 0.14 0.41 -6.66 7.53 1.27 1.79 -7.80 11.07
2 years 3 years 1.46 3.66 5.36 -7.35 14.12 3.19 4.73 -9.63 18.42
3 years 4 years 6.71 5.93 10.31 -6.62 24.23 4.06 6.87 -12.63 24.84
4 years 11.11 3.18 4.59 -13.92 22.10 6.76 10.03 -12.81 31.02
Panel B: Market-adjusted returns
 
At least Less than Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile
 1 day n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1 day 1 week -0.99 -0.75 -0.65 -1.67 0.31 -1.65 -0.67 -4.26 1.54
1 week 1 month -2.45 -1.73 -1.35 -3.54 -0.22 -3.00 -2.32 -6.91 1.00
1 month 2 months -3.48 -0.56 -1.92 -4.36 0.38 -2.86 -2.52 -7.11 1.55
2 months 3 months -4.15 -1.85 -2.46 -4.90 0.08 -2.88 -2.98 -7.72 1.80
3 months 4 months -3.44 -2.22 -2.19 -5.16 0.09 -2.41 -2.58 -7.78 2.60
4 months 5 months -3.19 -1.77 -2.06 -4.89 0.03 -2.06 -2.34 -7.58 2.75
5 months 6 months -3.24 -1.70 -1.70 -4.20 0.72 -1.37 -1.93 -7.32 3.81
6 months 9 months -2.17 -1.07 -1.02 -3.63 1.27 -1.05 -1.19 -6.33 4.02
9 months 1 year -0.96 -0.49 -0.19 -4.04 2.21 0.52 0.18 -5.71 5.82
1 year 2 years 1.01 2.42 1.93 -1.27 5.91 3.27 2.26 -3.77 9.47
2 years 3 years 0.11 1.32 0.43 -4.74 8.00 5.81 4.89 -4.37 16.40
3 years 4 years 0.21 0.55 1.82 -7.10 8.48 5.65 5.71 -8.91 22.98
4 years 0.26 -3.09 -1.55 -13.55 12.73 5.72 7.64 -12.04 30.17
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by funds in the 
database for five or more years. The table reports FIFO round-trip trade average returns that are weighted by principal amount (initial 
share price times number of shares) within each holding period category. Raw return (Panel A) is the percentage price change over the 
holding period; market-adjusted return (Panel B) subtracts the S&P index return over the holding period from the raw return. No market-
adjusted returns are available for trades lasting less than one day because intraday time stamps are incomplete.
Aggregate 
Trade 
Returns
Aggregate 
Trade 
Returns
Holding Period
Money Managers Pension Funds
Money Managers Pension Funds
Fund-level Trade Returns
Fund-level Trade Returns
Holding Period
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Table 6
Trade returns by holding period IF trades had been held for one year instead of less than one month.
 
Raw returns on trades held less than one month IF they had been held for one year
At least Less than Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile Mean Median 25th P'tile 75th P'tile
 1 day 31.01 20.00 13.32 3.68 29.91 36.23 4.64 -16.81 39.20
1 day 1 week 34.11 15.36 11.39 2.14 24.28 7.29 3.05 -13.28 18.32
1 week 1 month 31.04 31.23 8.90 4.34 22.44 13.21 5.14 -6.80 17.27
Actual
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by funds in the 
database for five or more years. For each actual trade in the database that was held for less than one month under the FIFO method, we 
calculate the "what-if" one-year return as the return the trade would have earned if it had been held for a full year instead of closed within 
one month. The table reports round-trip trade average "what-if" raw returns that are weighted by principal amount (initial share price times 
number of shares) within each holding period category. 
Aggregate 
1-year "What-if" 
Trade Returns
Fund-level 1-year "What-if" Trade Returns
Holding Period Money Managers Pension Funds
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Table 7
Short-duration trade return persistence at the fund level.
 
Panel A: Trades held less than one day, Money Managers
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 -1.53 -0.13 0.12 0.07 0.12
(-7.7) (-0.9) (0.6) (0.8) (0.7)
Q2 -0.27 0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.03
(-6.5) (0.5) (-0.4) (-0.6) (0.6)
Q3 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02
(1.4) (-0.1) (-0.6) (0.4) (-0.2)
Q4 0.41 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.13
(8.1) (0.4) (0.8) (0.1) (-1.3)
Q5 2.28 0.53 0.39 0.20 0.57
(6.9) (1.7) (1.3) (0.6) (1.5)
Q5-Q1 3.81 0.66 0.27 0.13 0.45
(10.9) (1.8) (0.8) (0.4) (1.6)
Panel B: Trades held less than one day, Pension Funds
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 -5.30 0.03 1.01 0.01 -0.23
(-5.5) (0.0) (1.4) (0.0) (-0.3)
Q2 -0.21 -0.29 -1.28 0.76 1.36
(-4.3) (-0.5) (-0.7) (1.5) (2.0)
Q3 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.53 1.17
(0.0) (0.4) (0.1) (-1.0) (1.3)
Q4 0.61 0.71 0.30 -1.86 1.15
(6.1) (2.3) (0.3) (-0.8) (1.5)
Q5 7.10 2.22 1.26 2.34 0.65
(7.6) (3.5) (2.3) (3.1) (0.8)
Q5-Q1 12.41 2.19 0.25 2.33 0.88
(8.1) (2.0) (0.3) (2.5) (1.0)
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 
2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Analysis is run separately for money manager funds and for 
pension funds. In each panel, funds are sorted into quintiles based on the average returns on their short-duration 
FIFO round-trip trades in each semiannual period, and the average fund returns (in %) for each quintile are 
reported in the quintile formation period (Base period ) and the subsequent four semiannual periods (Base+1 , 
Base+2 , Base+3 , and Base+4 ). Average returns for each fund's round-trip trades within each holding period 
category are weighted across trades by principal amount (initial share price times number of shares).  Returns for 
trades lasting less than three months (Panels C and D) are market-adjusted; returns for trades lasting less than one 
day (Panels A and B) are not market-adjusted because intraday timestamps are incomplete. Numbers in 
parentheses are t -statistics, which are computed based on two-way clustered standard errors. 
Semiannual periods
Semiannual periods
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Panel C: Trades held less than three months, Money Managers
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 -16.65 -3.30 -3.41 -0.73 -0.97
(-10.8) (-2.3) (-1.8) (-0.4) (-0.5)
Q2 -5.59 -2.45 -2.43 -1.89 -1.27
(-7.5) (-2.9) (-2.1) (-2.8) (-1.3)
Q3 -2.00 -0.99 -1.78 -1.32 -1.24
(-3.8) (-1.7) (-3.0) (-2.0) (-1.8)
Q4 1.56 -0.92 -0.28 -0.66 -1.72
(3.1) (-1.2) (-0.4) (-0.7) (-1.7)
Q5 12.45 2.10 3.47 1.24 2.74
(7.7) (1.7) (2.0) (0.9) (2.4)
Q5-Q1 29.09 5.40 6.88 1.97 3.72
(10.6) (3.6) (3.0) (1.1) (2.3)
Panel D: Trades held less than three months, Pension Funds
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 -21.50 -5.42 -5.48 -4.80 -4.23
(-12.3) (-4.8) (-5.5) (-4.7) (-4.0)
Q2 -7.37 -4.19 -4.60 -3.89 -3.65
(-9.2) (-5.3) (-5.3) (-4.2) (-4.1)
Q3 -2.43 -2.86 -2.41 -2.88 -2.99
(-5.1) (-4.2) (-3.2) (-4.2) (-4.4)
Q4 1.75 -1.85 -1.57 -1.68 -2.01
(5.1) (-2.7) (-2.2) (-2.6) (-3.2)
Q5 16.45 0.58 -0.35 -0.59 -0.06
(15.3) (0.7) (-0.4) (-0.6) (-0.1)
Q5-Q1 37.95 6.00 5.12 4.22 4.17
(16.0) (5.0) (5.6) (4.2) (5.0)
Semiannual periods
Semiannual periods
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Table 8
Short-duration trading amount following returns.
 
Panel A: Trades held less than one day, Money Managers
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.31 0.19
(2.6) (4.1) (2.4) (1.9) (5.0)
Q2 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.27
(8.2) (3.6) (2.8) (4.5) (2.7)
Q3 0.61 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.31
(3.5) (3.1) (3.3) (2.8) (2.4)
Q4 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.30
(5.4) (4.9) (6.1) (4.5) (3.2)
Q5 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.26 0.24
(3.0) (2.7) (2.8) (5.5) (5.1)
Q5-Q1 0.05 0.09 0.12 -0.05 0.04
(0.4) (0.7) (2.9) (-0.3) (1.0)
Panel B: Trades held less than one day, Pension Funds
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 2.10 2.42 3.31 1.61 5.25
(3.8) (2.0) (1.9) (2.5) (1.4)
Q2 5.30 3.49 2.49 6.04 2.84
(4.0) (2.7) (1.7) (1.9) (1.9)
Q3 3.61 4.30 5.33 4.46 7.20
(3.7) (3.6) (2.7) (3.4) (2.4)
Q4 2.11 2.35 4.58 7.27 4.67
(3.3) (2.2) (2.1) (2.2) (2.5)
Q5 0.84 2.09 1.49 2.19 0.83
(6.1) (2.4) (2.2) (1.5) (3.1)
Q5-Q1 -1.26 -0.33 -1.82 0.58 -4.42
(-2.2) (-0.3) (-1.0) (0.8) (-1.1)
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 
2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Analysis is run separately for money manager funds and for 
pension funds. In each panel, funds are sorted into quintiles based on the average returns on their short-duration 
FIFO round-trip trades in each semiannual period, and the average percentages of share volume that occurs in 
short-duration trades (in %) for each quintile are reported in the quintile formation period (Base period ) and the 
subsequent four semiannual periods (Base+1 , Base+2 , Base+3 , and Base+4 ). Numbers in parentheses are t -
statistics, which are computed based on two-way clustered standard errors. 
Semiannual periods
Semiannual periods
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Panel C: Trades held less than three months, Money Managers
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 15.84 17.39 20.06 19.55 28.12
(5.8) (6.0) (5.4) (4.7) (5.6)
Q2 18.75 21.29 22.52 24.22 26.27
(7.1) (6.8) (5.9) (5.8) (5.5)
Q3 21.39 20.99 20.45 20.93 20.88
(7.1) (6.2) (6.4) (6.1) (6.0)
Q4 22.12 21.12 22.51 21.72 21.59
(6.8) (6.3) (5.1) (5.8) (4.4)
Q5 18.53 16.84 14.32 17.33 16.98
(5.2) (4.7) (5.4) (4.3) (6.1)
Q5-Q1 2.69 -0.55 -5.74 -2.22 -11.14
(1.4) (-0.2) (-2.2) (-0.8) (-3.1)
Panel D: Trades held less than three months, Pension Funds
Quintile Base period Base +1 Base +2 Base +3 Base +4
Q1 16.91 18.99 19.97 19.25 21.23
(12.2) (11.3) (12.9) (11.2) (11.4)
Q2 20.86 20.82 21.27 22.84 23.57
(14.2) (14.7) (12.7) (13.8) (13.3)
Q3 22.25 21.21 21.25 21.93 22.51
(16.8) (15.0) (13.2) (12.1) (11.7)
Q4 21.09 19.97 20.45 21.91 22.32
(15.3) (12.5) (13.4) (12.3) (11.4)
Q5 15.68 17.44 18.62 19.54 21.12
(9.5) (11.1) (9.9) (9.2) (9.4)
Q5-Q1 -1.23 -1.55 -1.35 0.29 -0.12
(-1.7) (-1.8) (-1.8) (0.3) (-0.1)
Semiannual periods
Semiannual periods
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Fig. 1
Proportion of short-duration trades by fund.
Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009 by 
funds in the database for five or more years.  The first two graphs present the percentages of round-trip trading volume of 
each fund that occurs in trades held for less than one month under the FIFO and LIFO methods for identifying round-trip 
trades. For example, in the first graph the third bar shows that for 106 funds in the database, trades held less than one month 
account for between 10% and 20% of their total trading volume.  The last two graphs present the percentages of round-trip 
trading volume for each fund that occurs in trades held for less than three months.
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Fig. 2
Monthly periodicity of short-duration trades.
 Institutional trading data are from Ancerno Ltd. for trades executed between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 
2009 by funds in the database for five or more years. Each graph portrays the percentage of trading volume in 
each month that consists of trades held for less than one month. Aggregate statistics are calculated across all 
trades in each month-year, and means are reported for each month.  Fund-level averages are calculated for each 
fund-month-year, and means are reported for each month. In the top graph trades are identified using the FIFO 
method, and in the bottom graph they are defined using the LIFO method.  
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